Merleau Ponty What Is Art Merleauponty What Is Art

French phenomenological philosopher

Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Born	Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty (1908-03-xiv)xiv March 1908 Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Inférieure, France
Died	3 May 1961(1961-05-03) (anile 53) Paris, France
Alma mater	École Normale Supérieure, Academy of Paris[one]
Era	20th-century philosophy
Region	Western philosophy
School	Phenomenology Existential phenomenology Embodied phenomenology[2] Western Marxism Structuralism[3] Post-structuralism[four]
Main interests	Aesthetics· anthropology· consciousness· embodiment·· meaning· ontology· perception· politics· psychology
Notable ideas	Invagination, Gestalt, anonymous collectivity,[5] motor intentionality,[6] [7] the flesh of the world, incarnation,[8] chiasm (chiasme), speaking vs. spoken linguistic communication,[nine] institution[x]
Influences Bachelard· Beauvoir· Bergson[11]· Brunschvicg· Coghill· Chardin· Darwin· Descartes· Driesch· Fink[12]· Freud· Gesell· Hegel· Heidegger· Heraclitus· Husserl· Kant· Klein· Koffka[xiii]· Köhler· Kojève· Lacan· Lévi-Strauss· Malebranche· Marcel· Marx· Mounier· Nietzsche· Piaget· Plotinus· Proust· Sartre· Saussure[14]· Scheler· Schelling· Schilder· Tinbergen· Uexküll· Weber· Whitehead
Influenced Ahmed· Abram· Barbaras· Bourdieu· Butler· Castoriadis· Clark· Crowther· Danto· Deleuze· Diprose· Dreyfus· Edie· El-Bizri· Foucault· Gallagher· Giorgi· Guenther· Harman· Henry· Hillman· Ihde· Irigaray· Johnson· Kompridis· Lacan[15]· Laplanche· Lawlor· Lefort· Manha· McClamrock· Polanyi· Ricoeur· Sartre· Schillebeeckx· Simondon· Thảo· Thompson· Varela· Vesely· Virilio· Young· Zahavi

Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty ^[16] (French: [mɔʁis mɛʁlo pɔ̃ti, moʁ-]; 14 March 1908 – 3 May 1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The constitution of pregnant in human experience was his principal interest and he wrote on perception, art, politics, religion, biological science, psychology, psychoanalysis, language, nature, and history. He was the pb editor of Les Temps modernes, the leftist magazine he established with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir in 1945.

At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role that perception plays in the human experience of the world. Merleau-Ponty understands perception to be an ongoing dialogue between i's lived body and the world which information technology perceives, in which perceivers passively and actively strive to limited the perceived globe in concert with others. He was the only major phenomenologist of the outset half of the twentieth century to engage extensively with the sciences and especially with Gestalt psychology. Information technology is through this date that his writings became influential in the project of naturalizing phenomenology, in which phenomenologists use the results of psychology and cognitive science.

Merleau-Ponty emphasized the body every bit the principal site of knowing the globe, a corrective to the long philosophical tradition of placing consciousness as the source of knowledge, and maintained that the body and that which it perceived could non be disentangled from each other. The articulation of the primacy of apotheosis (corporéité) led him away from phenomenology towards what he was to call "indirect ontology" or the ontology of "the flesh of the world" (la chair du monde), seen in his last and incomplete work, The Visible and Invisible, and his last published essay, "Eye and Mind".

Merleau-Ponty engaged with Marxism throughout his career. His 1947 book, Humanism and Terror, has been widely misunderstood^[17] as a defense of the Soviet farce trials. In fact, this text avoids the definitive endorsement of a view on the Soviet Union, but instead engages with the Marxist theory of history as a critique of liberalism, in club to reveal an unresolved antinomy in modern politics, between humanism and terror: if human being values can only be achieved through violent force, and if liberal ideas hide illiberal realities, how is only political action to be decided?^[18] Merleau-Ponty maintained an engaged though critical relationship to the Marxist left until the stop of his life, peculiarly during his fourth dimension as the political editor of the journal Les Temps modernes.

Life [edit]

Merleau-Ponty's grave at Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris, where he is cached with his mother Louise, his wife Suzanne, and his daughter Marianne

Maurice Merleau-Ponty was built-in in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Inférieure (now Charente-Maritime), France. His father died in 1913 when Merleau-Ponty was five years quondam.^[19] After secondary schooling at the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, Merleau-Ponty became a pupil at the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied aslope Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Simone Weil, Jean Hyppolite, and Jean Wahl. Equally Beauvoir recounts in her autobiography, she developed a close friendship with Merleau-Ponty and became smitten with him, only ultimately found him too well-adjusted to bourgeois life and values for her gustatory modality. He attended Edmund Husserl's "Paris Lectures" in February 1929.^[twenty] In 1929, Merleau-Ponty received his DES caste (diplôme d'études supérieures [fr] , roughly equivalent to a M.A. thesis) from the University of Paris, on the basis of the (now-lost) thesis La Notion de multiple intelligible chez Plotin ("Plotinus'southward Notion of the Intelligible Many"), directed by Émile Bréhier.^[21] He passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1930.

Merleau-Ponty was raised as a Roman Catholic. He was friends with the Christian existentialist author and philosopher Gabriel Marcel and wrote manufactures for the Christian leftist periodical Esprit, but he left the Catholic Church in 1937 because he felt his socialist politics were not compatible with the social and political doctrine of the Cosmic Church.^[22]

An article published in the French newspaper Le Monde in October 2014 makes the case of recent discoveries near Merleau-Ponty's likely authorship of the novel Nord. Récit de 50'arctique (Grasset, 1928). Convergent sources from shut friends (Beauvoir, Elisabeth "Zaza" Lacoin) seem to get out petty dubiety that Jacques Heller was a pseudonym of the twenty-twelvemonth-former Merleau-Ponty.^[23]

Merleau-Ponty taught first at the Lycée de Beauvais (1931–33) and so got a fellowship to do research from the Caisse nationale de la recherche scientifique [fr]. From 1934 to 1935 he taught at the Lycée de Chartres. He then in 1935 became a tutor at the École Normale Supérieure, where he tutored a immature Michel Foucault and Trần Đức Thảo and was awarded his doctorate on the ground of 2 important books: La structure du comportement (1942) and Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945). During this time, he attended Alexandre Kojeve'south influential seminars on Hegel and Aron Gurwitsch's lectures on Gestalt psychology.

In the spring of 1939, he was the first foreign company to the newly established Husserl Athenaeum, where he consulted Husserl'due south unpublished manuscripts and met Eugen Fink and Begetter Hermann Van Breda. In the summer of 1939, as France declared state of war on Nazi Germany, he served on the frontlines in the French Army, where he was wounded in boxing in June 1940. Upon returning to Paris in the fall of 1940, he married Suzanne Jolibois, a Lacanian psychoanalyst, and founded an secret resistance grouping with Jean-Paul Sartre called "Under the Boot". He participated in an armed demonstration against the Nazi forces during the liberation of Paris.^[24] After teaching at the University of Lyon from 1945 to 1948, Merleau-Ponty lectured on kid psychology and education at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952.^[25] He was awarded the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 until his death in 1961, making him the youngest person to have been elected to a chair.

Likewise his instruction, Merleau-Ponty was too political editor for the leftist journal Les Temps modernes from its founding in Oct 1945 until December 1952. In his youth, he had read Karl Marx's writings^[26] and Sartre fifty-fifty claimed that Merleau-Ponty converted him to Marxism.^[27] While he was not a member of the French Communist Political party and did not place as a Communist, he laid out an statement justifying the Soviet farce trials and political violence for progressive ends in general in the work Humanism and Terror in 1947. Withal, most three years later, he renounced his earlier support for political violence, rejected Marxism, and advocated a liberal left position in Adventures of the Dialectic (1955).^[28] His friendship with Sartre and work with Les Temps modernes concluded considering of that, since Sartre all the same had a more favourable attitude towards Soviet communism. Merleau-Ponty was subsequently active in the French non-communist left and in item in the Union of the Democratic Forces.

Merleau-Ponty died all of a sudden of a stroke in 1961 at historic period 53, apparently while preparing for a class on René Descartes, leaving an unfinished manuscript which was posthumously published in 1964, along with a selection of Merleau-Ponty'southward working notes, past Claude Lefort as The Visible and the Invisible. He is buried in Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris with his mother Louise, his wife Suzanne and their girl Marianne.

Thought [edit]

Consciousness [edit]

In his Phenomenology of Perception (first published in French in 1945), Merleau-Ponty develops the concept of the body-subject (le corps propre) as an alternative to the Cartesian "cogito".^{[ citation needed ]} This stardom is especially of import in that Merleau-Ponty perceives the essences of the earth existentially. Consciousness, the world, and the human being torso every bit a perceiving thing are intricately intertwined and mutually "engaged". The phenomenal matter is not the unchanging object of the natural sciences, merely a correlate of our body and its sensory-motor functions. Taking up and "communing with" (Merleau-Ponty's phrase) the sensible qualities it encounters, the body as incarnated subjectivity intentionally elaborates things within an always-present world frame, through use of its pre-conscious, pre-predicative understanding of the globe's makeup. The elaboration, yet, is "inexhaustible" (the authentication of whatever perception according to Merleau-Ponty). Things are that upon which our body has a "grip" (prise), while the grip itself is a role of our connaturality with the world's things. The world and the sense of cocky are emergent phenomena in an ongoing "becoming".

The essential partiality of our view of things, their being given merely in a certain perspective and at a sure moment in fourth dimension does not diminish their reality, just on the contrary establishes it, as there is no other way for things to be copresent with united states of america and with other things than through such "Abschattungen" (sketches, faint outlines, adumbrations). The thing transcends our view, simply is manifest precisely by presenting itself to a range of possible views. The object of perception is immanently tied to its background—to the nexus of meaningful relations amidst objects within the globe. Because the object is inextricably within the world of meaningful relations, each object reflects the other (much in the style of Leibniz'southward monads). Through interest in the globe – being-in-the-world – the perceiver tacitly experiences all the perspectives upon that object coming from all the surrounding things of its environment, as well as the potential perspectives that that object has upon the beings around it.

Each object is a "mirror of all others". Our perception of the object through all perspectives is not that of a propositional, or clearly delineated, perception; rather, information technology is an ambiguous perception founded upon the torso'due south primordial involvement and agreement of the world and of the meanings that plant the landscape's perceptual Gestalt. Just later we have been integrated within the environment so as to perceive objects as such can we turn our attending toward particular objects within the mural so as to define them more than clearly. This attention, yet, does not operate by clarifying what is already seen, merely by constructing a new Gestalt oriented toward a particular object. Because our bodily interest with things is ever provisional and indeterminate, we encounter meaningful things in a unified though always open-ended globe.

The primacy of perception [edit]

From the time of writing Construction of Beliefs and Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty wanted to show, in opposition to the thought that collection the tradition outset with John Locke, that perception was non the causal product of diminutive sensations. This atomist-causal conception was beingness perpetuated in sure psychological currents of the time, particularly in behaviourism. According to Merleau-Ponty, perception has an active dimension, in that it is a primordial openness to the lifeworld (the "Lebenswelt").

This primordial openness is at the heart of his thesis of the primacy of perception. The slogan of Husserl's phenomenology is "all consciousness is consciousness of something", which implies a stardom between "acts of thought" (the noesis) and "intentional objects of thought" (the noema). Thus, the correlation between noesis and noema becomes the first footstep in the constitution of analyses of consciousness. Even so, in studying the posthumous manuscripts of Husserl, who remained one of his major influences, Merleau-Ponty remarked that, in their evolution, Husserl'south work brings to low-cal phenomena which are not assimilable to cognition–noema correlation. This is particularly the instance when 1 attends to the phenomena of the torso (which is at once body-subject field and body-object), subjective time (the consciousness of fourth dimension is neither an human activity of consciousness nor an object of thought) and the other (the get-go considerations of the other in Husserl led to solipsism).

The stardom between "acts of thought" (noesis) and "intentional objects of thought" (noema) does non seem, therefore, to establish an irreducible ground. It appears rather at a higher level of assay. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not postulate that "all consciousness is consciousness of something", which supposes at the get-go a noetic-noematic footing. Instead, he develops the thesis according to which "all consciousness is perceptual consciousness". In doing then, he establishes a significant turn in the evolution of phenomenology, indicating that its conceptualisations should exist re-examined in the calorie-free of the primacy of perception, in weighing up the philosophical consequences of this thesis.

Corporeity [edit]

Taking the study of perception every bit his point of divergence, Merleau-Ponty was led to recognize that one's own body (le corps propre) is not only a thing, a potential object of written report for science, but is likewise a permanent condition of feel, a constituent of the perceptual openness to the world. He therefore underlines the fact that there is an inherence of consciousness and of the torso of which the analysis of perception should have business relationship. The primacy of perception signifies a primacy of experience, and so to speak, insofar equally perception becomes an active and constitutive dimension.

Merleau-Ponty demonstrates a corporeity of consciousness every bit much as an intentionality of the torso, and and so stands in dissimilarity with the dualist ontology of mind and trunk in Descartes, a philosopher to whom Merleau-Ponty continually returned, despite the of import differences that split up them. In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty wrote: "Insofar as I accept hands, anxiety, a trunk, I sustain effectually me intentions which are not dependent on my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way that I do non choose" (1962, p. 440).

Spatiality [edit]

The question concerning corporeity connects likewise with Merleau-Ponty'south reflections on space (l'espace) and the primacy of the dimension of depth (la profondeur) every bit implied in the notion of being in the world (être au monde; to echo Heidegger's In-der-Welt-sein) and of ane'southward ain body (le corps propre).^[29] Reflections on spatiality in phenomenology are besides primal to the advanced philosophical deliberations in architectural theory.^[30]

Linguistic communication [edit]

The highlighting of the fact that corporeity intrinsically has a dimension of expressivity which proves to be cardinal to the constitution of the ego is one of the conclusions of The Construction of Behavior that is constantly reiterated in Merleau-Ponty's afterward works. Following this theme of expressivity, he goes on to examine how an incarnate subject is in a position to undertake actions that transcend the organic level of the body, such as in intellectual operations and the products of ane's cultural life.

He carefully considers language, then, as the core of culture, by examining in particular the connections betwixt the unfolding of idea and sense—enriching his perspective not merely by an analysis of the acquisition of language and the expressivity of the body, but also by taking into account pathologies of language, painting, movie theatre, literature, poetry, and music.

This work deals mainly with language, get-go with the reflection on creative expression in The Structure of Behavior—which contains a passage on El Greco (p. 203ff) that prefigures the remarks that he develops in "Cézanne'south Doubt" (1945) and follows the discussion in Phenomenology of Perception. The work, undertaken while serving equally the Chair of Child Psychology and Pedagogy at the University of the Sorbonne, is non a departure from his philosophical and phenomenological works, but rather an important continuation in the evolution of his thought.

As the form outlines of his Sorbonne lectures indicate, during this menses he continues a dialogue between phenomenology and the diverse piece of work carried out in psychology, all in lodge to return to the report of the acquisition of linguistic communication in children, besides as to broadly take advantage of the contribution of Ferdinand de Saussure to linguistics, and to work on the notion of construction through a discussion of work in psychology, linguistics and social anthropology.

Fine art [edit]

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes betwixt primary and secondary modes of expression. This distinction appears in Phenomenology of Perception (p. 207, 2d note [Fr. ed.]) and is sometimes repeated in terms of spoken and speaking language ( le langage parlé et le langage parlant ) (The Prose of the Earth, p. 10). Spoken language ( le langage parlé ), or secondary expression, returns to our linguistic luggage, to the cultural heritage that we have acquired, likewise as the brute mass of relationships betwixt signs and significations. Speaking linguistic communication ( le langage parlant ), or primary expression, such as it is, is language in the production of a sense, language at the appearance of a thought, at the moment where it makes itself an advent of sense.

It is speaking language, that is to say, primary expression, that interests Merleau-Ponty and which keeps his attending through his treatment of the nature of production and the reception of expressions, a subject area which also overlaps with an analysis of action, of intentionality, of perception, also as the links between freedom and external conditions.

The notion of style occupies an important place in "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence". In spite of certain similarities with André Malraux, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes himself from Malraux in respect to three conceptions of style, the last of which is employed in Malraux's The Voices of Silence. Merleau-Ponty remarks that in this piece of work "fashion" is sometimes used past Malraux in a highly subjective sense, understood equally a projection of the creative person's individuality. Sometimes information technology is used, on the contrary, in a very metaphysical sense (in Merleau-Ponty's opinion, a mystical sense), in which manner is continued with a conception of an "über-artist" expressing "the Spirit of Painting". Finally, information technology sometimes is reduced to simply designating a categorization of an artistic school or movement. (However, this account of Malraux'south notion of style—a key element in his thinking—is open to serious question.^[31])

For Merleau-Ponty, it is these uses of the notion of style that lead Malraux to postulate a cleavage between the objectivity of Italian Renaissance painting and the subjectivity of painting in his ain time, a decision that Merleau-Ponty disputes. Co-ordinate to Merleau-Ponty, it is important to consider the heart of this problematic, by recognizing that style is first of all a need owed to the primacy of perception, which besides implies taking into consideration the dimensions of historicity and intersubjectivity. (All the same, Merleau-Ponty's reading of Malraux has been questioned in a recent major written report of Malraux's theory of art which argues that Merleau-Ponty seriously misunderstood Malraux.)^[32] For Merleau-Ponty, fashion is born of the interaction between ii or more fields of being. Rather than being exclusive to individual man consciousness, consciousness is born of the pre-conscious style of the world, of Nature.

Science [edit]

In his essay Cézanne'south Uncertainty, in which he identifies Paul Cézanne's impressionistic theory of painting as coordinating to his ain concept of radical reflection, the attempt to return to, and reflect on, prereflective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty identifies scientific discipline equally the opposite of art. In Merleau-Ponty's account, whereas fine art is an attempt to capture an individual'south perception, science is anti-individualistic. In the preface to his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty presents a phenomenological objection to positivism: that it can tell us nothing about human subjectivity. All that a scientific text tin can explain is the item individual experience of that scientist, which cannot be transcended. For Merleau-Ponty, science neglects the depth and profundity of the phenomena that it endeavors to explain.

Merleau-Ponty understood science to be an ex post facto brainchild. Causal and physiological accounts of perception, for example, explain perception in terms that are arrived at only later on abstracting from the phenomenon itself. Merleau-Ponty chastised science for taking itself to be the surface area in which a complete business relationship of nature may be given. The subjective depth of phenomena cannot exist given in scientific discipline as it is. This characterizes Merleau-Ponty'south attempt to ground scientific discipline in phenomenological objectivity and, in essence, to institute a "return to the phenomena".

Influence [edit]

Anticognitivist cognitive scientific discipline [edit]

Merleau-Ponty'southward critical position with respect to scientific discipline was stated in his Preface to the Phenomenology: he described scientific points of view as "always both naive and at the same fourth dimension dishonest". Despite, or maybe because of, this view, his piece of work influenced and anticipated the strands of mod psychology known as post-cognitivism. Hubert Dreyfus has been instrumental in emphasising the relevance of Merleau-Ponty'southward piece of work to current post-cognitive research, and its criticism of the traditional view of cerebral science.

Dreyfus'southward seminal critique of cognitivism (or the computational account of the heed), What Computers Can't Practice, consciously replays Merleau-Ponty'due south critique of intellectualist psychology to argue for the irreducibility of corporeal know-how to discrete, syntactic processes. Through the influence of Dreyfus'south critique and neurophysiological alternative, Merleau-Ponty became associated with neurophysiological, connectionist accounts of cognition.

With the publication in 1991 of The Embodied Mind past Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, this clan was extended, if merely partially, to another strand of "anti-cognitivist" or postal service-representationalist cognitive science: embodied or enactive cognitive science, and later in the decade, to neurophenomenology. In addition, Merleau-Ponty'south work has besides influenced researchers trying to integrate neuroscience with the principles of chaos theory.^[33]

It was through this relationship with Merleau-Ponty's work that cognitive science'south affair with phenomenology was born, which is represented past a growing number of works, including

• Ron McClamrock's Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the Earth (1995),
• Andy Clark'due south Being At that place (1997),
• Naturalizing Phenomenology edited by Petitot et al. (1999),
• Alva Noë'south Action in Perception (2004),
• Shaun Gallagher'due south How the Trunk Shapes the Mind (2005),
• Grammont, Franck Dorothée Legrand, and Pierre Livet (eds.) 2010, Naturalizing Intention in Action, MIT Press 2010 ISBN 978-0-262-01367-3.
• The journal Phenomenology and the Cerebral Sciences.

Feminist philosophy [edit]

Merleau-Ponty has also been picked up by Australian and Nordic philosophers inspired by the French feminist tradition, including Rosalyn Diprose and Sara Heinämaa [fi].

Heinämaa has argued for a rereading of Merleau-Ponty's influence on Simone de Beauvoir. (She has also challenged Dreyfus'southward reading of Merleau-Ponty equally behaviorist^{[ commendation needed ]}, and every bit neglecting the importance of the phenomenological reduction to Merleau-Ponty's thought.)

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the trunk has also been taken up by Iris Young in her essay "Throwing Like a Daughter," and its follow-up, "'Throwing Like a Girl': Twenty Years Later". Young analyzes the particular modalities of feminine bodily comportment as they differ from that of men. Young observes that while a man who throws a ball puts his whole torso into the motion, a woman throwing a ball generally restricts her own movements equally she makes them, and that, by and large, in sports, women move in a more tentative, reactive way. Merleau-Ponty argues that we experience the world in terms of the "I tin can" – that is, oriented towards certain projects based on our capacity and habituality. Young'south thesis is that in women, this intentionality is inhibited and ambivalent, rather than confident, experienced as an "I cannot".

Ecophenomenology [edit]

Ecophenomenology can exist described as the pursuit of the relationalities of worldly date, both human and those of other creatures (Chocolate-brown & Toadvine 2003).

This engagement is situated in a kind of center footing of relationality, a space that is neither purely objective, because information technology is reciprocally constituted by a multifariousness of lived experiences motivating the movements of endless organisms, nor purely subjective, because it is however a field of fabric relationships between bodies. It is governed exclusively neither by causality, nor by intentionality. In this infinite of in-betweenness, phenomenology tin overcome its inaugural opposition to naturalism.^[34]

David Abram explains Merleau-Ponty'south concept of "flesh" (chair) equally "the mysterious tissue or matrix that underlies and gives ascension to both the perceiver and the perceived as interdependent aspects of its spontaneous activity", and he identifies this elemental matrix with the interdependent spider web of earthly life.^[35] This concept unites subject and object dialectically every bit determinations within a more primordial reality, which Merleau-Ponty calls "the flesh" and which Abram refers to variously every bit "the breathing earth", "the breathing biosphere" or "the more-than-man natural world". Yet this is not nature or the biosphere conceived equally a circuitous prepare of objects and objective processes, only rather "the biosphere as information technology is experienced and lived from within by the intelligent body — by the attentive human being creature who is entirely a part of the world that he or she experiences. Merleau-Ponty's ecophenemonology with its emphasis on holistic dialog within the larger-than-human world also has implications for the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of language; indeed he states that "language is the very vocalism of the copse, the waves and the forest".^[36]

Merleau-Ponty himself refers to "that primordial beingness which is not yet the bailiwick-being nor the object-beingness and which in every respect baffles reflection. From this primordial being to us, at that place is no derivation, nor any intermission..."^[37] Amid the many working notes found on his desk at the time of his death, and published with the one-half-complete manuscript of The Visible and the Invisible, several make it evident that Merleau-Ponty himself recognized a deep affinity betwixt his notion of a primordial "mankind" and a radically transformed agreement of "nature". Hence, in November 1960 he writes: "Practise a psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the mankind, the mother."^[38] And in the last published working note, written in March 1961, he writes: "Nature as the other side of humanity (as flesh, nowise as 'matter')."^[39] This resonates with the conception of space, place, dwelling, and embodiment (in the flesh and physical, vs. virtual and cybernetic), peculiarly as they are addressed against the background of the unfolding of the essence of mod engineering science. Such analytics effigy in a Heideggerian take on "econtology" as an extension of Heidegger'southward consideration of the question of being (Seinsfrage) past way of the fourfold (Das Geviert) of globe-sky-mortals-divinities (Erde und Himmel, Sterblichen und Göttlichen). In this strand of "ecophenomenology", ecology is co-entangled with ontology, whereby the worldly existential analytics are grounded in earthiness, and environmentalism is orientated by ontological thinking.^[forty]

Bibliography [edit]

The following table gives a pick of Merleau-Ponty'southward works in French and English language translation.

Year	Original French	English language Translation
1942	La Structure du comportement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942)	The Structure of Beliefs trans. by Alden Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963; London: Methuen, 1965)
1945	Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945)	Phenomenology of Perception trans. past Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); trans. revised by Forrest Williams (1981; reprinted, 2002); new trans. by Donald A. Landes (New York: Routledge, 2012)
1947	Humanisme et terreur, essai sur le problème communiste (Paris: Gallimard, 1947)	Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Trouble trans. by John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Printing, 1969)
1948	Sens et non-sens (Paris: Nagel, 1948, 1966)	Sense and Not-Sense trans. past Hubert Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Printing, 1964)
1949–50	Conscience et l'acquisition du langage (Paris: Message de psychologie, 236, vol. XVIII, three–6, November. 1964)	Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language trans. by Hugh J. Silverman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973)
1949–52	Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne: résumé de cours, 1949-1952 (Grenoble: Cynara, 1988)	Kid Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952 trans. past Talia Welsh (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010)
1951	Les Relations avec autrui chez 50'enfant (Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1951, 1975)	The Kid's Relations with Others trans. by William Cobb in The Primacy of Perception ed. by James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 96-155
1953	Éloge de la Philosophie, Lecon inaugurale faite au Collége de France, Le jeudi xv janvier 1953 (Paris: Gallimard, 1953)	In Praise of Philosophy trans. past John Wild and James Grand. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern Academy Press, 1963)
1955	Les aventures de la dialectique (Paris: Gallimard, 1955)	Adventures of the Dialectic trans. by Joseph Bien (Evanston: Northwestern University Printing, 1973; London: Heinemann, 1974)
1958	Les Sciences de l'homme et la phénoménologie (Paris: Eye de Documentation Universitaire, 1958, 1975)	Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man trans. by John Wild in The Primacy of Perception ed. by James Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 43–95
1960	Éloge de la Philosophie et autres essais (Paris: Gallimard, 1960)	-
1960	Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960)	Signs trans. past Richard McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964)
1961	Fifty'Œil et l'esprit (Paris: Gallimard, 1961)	Centre and Mind trans. by Carleton Dallery in The Primacy of Perception ed. by James Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 159–190; revised translation by Michael Smith in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader (1993), 121-149
1964	Le Visible et l'invisible, suivi de notes de travail Edited by Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1964)	The Visible and the Invisible, Followed by Working Notes trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Printing, 1968)
1968	Résumés de cours, Collège de France 1952-1960 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968)	Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France, 1952-1960 trans. past John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Printing, 1970)
1969	La Prose du monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1969)	The Prose of the World trans. by John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973; London: Heinemann, 1974)

See likewise [edit]

• Gestalt psychology
• Process philosophy
• Embodied cognition
• Enactivism
• Departure (philosophy)
• Virtuality (philosophy)
• Field (physics)
• Hylomorphism
• Autopoiesis
• Emergence
• Umwelt
• Habit
• Body schema
• Affordance
• Perspectivism
• Reflexivity
• Invagination (philosophy)
• Incarnation

Notes [edit]

1. ^ At the time, the ENS was function of the University of Paris co-ordinate to the prescript of 10 November 1903.
2. ^ Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Springer, 2014, p. 292; Douglas Low, Merleau-Ponty in Gimmicky Context, Transaction Publishers, 2013, p. 21; Jack Reynolds, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity, Ohio Academy Press, 2004, p. 192.
3. ^ Alan D. Schrift (2006), Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes And Thinkers, Blackwell Publishing, p. 46: "While Merleau-Ponty saw structuralism and phenomenology as compatible, with the former providing an objective assay of underlying social structures that would complement the latter's description of lived experience, the structuralists themselves were much less convinced of the need for or value of phenomenology every bit they engaged in their various structuralist inquiries."
4. ^ Lawrence Hass & Dorothea Olkoskwi, Rereading Merleau-Ponty: Essays Across the Continental-Analytic Split, Humanity Books, 2000: "Merleau-Ponty's thought — arguably, the starting time genuinely poststructuralist philosophy..."
5. ^ Martin C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty Vivant, SUNY Press, 1991, p. 63.
6. ^ Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 313.
7. ^ Marker A. Wrathall, Jeff Due east. Malpas (eds), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science - Volume 2, MIT Press, 2000, p. 167.
8. ^ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. three.
9. ^ Richard L. Lanigan, Speaking and Semiology: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Theory of Existential Advice, Walter de Gruyter, 1991, p. 49.
10. ^ Robert Vallier "Establishment: The Significance of Merleau-Ponty's 1954 Class at the Collège de France"
11. ^ Merleau-Ponty, M., 2002, Phenomenology of Perception, Colin Smith (tr.), New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 66–68.
12. ^ Dermot Moran, "Husserl'southward transcendental philosophy and the critique of naturalism" (2008), p. 20.
13. ^ Lester Embree, "Merleau-Ponty'due south Examination of Gestalt Psychology" Archived 2012-11-21 at the Wayback Machine, Enquiry in Phenomenology, Vol. 10 (1980): pp. 89–121.
14. ^ Maurice Merleau-Ponty - Biography Archived 2012-11-28 at the Wayback Machine at egs.edu
15. ^ Lacan, Jacques. "The Split between the Eye and the Gaze" (1964).
16. ^ Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
17. ^ Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Credo
18. ^ Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem
19. ^ Thomas Baldwin in Introduction to Merleau-Ponty's The Globe of Perception (New York: Routledge, 2008): two.
20. ^ Ted Toadvine, Lester Embree (eds.), Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl, Springer Science & Business Media, 2013, p. 229.
21. ^ Donald A. Landes, The Merleau-Ponty Lexicon, A&C Black, 2013, p. two.
22. ^ Matthews, Eric (2002). The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Chesham: Accumen. p. iii.
23. ^ Emmanuel Alloa, "Merleau-Ponty, tout united nations roman", Le Monde, 23.10.2014.
24. ^ Whiteside, Kerry H. (14 July 2014). Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of Existential Politics. Princeton University Press. p. 34. ISBN978-1-4008-5973-3. OCLC 1091433580. During the liberation of Paris he joined an armed street patrol.
25. ^ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Kid Psychology and Teaching: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949-1952. Translated past Talia Welsh. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010.
26. ^ Martin Jay, (1986), Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas, pages 361–85.
27. ^ Martin Jay, (1986), Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas, page 361.
28. ^ Emma Kathryn Kuby, Betwixt humanism and terror: the problem of political violence in postwar France, 1944-1962, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell Academy, 2011, pp. 243–iv: "Merleau-Ponty provisionally dedicated Soviet "terror" in the name of humanism, writing that so long as the USSR's violence was authentically revolutionary in its aims, it was justified by the fact that it was helping to produce a socialist world in which all violence would be eliminated. ... Notwithstanding about three years after it was published, Merleau-Ponty, also, decided that he no longer believed political violence could be justified by the purported humanist aims of the revolution."
29. ^ For recent investigations of this question refer to the following: Nader El-Bizri, "A Phenomenological Account of the 'Ontological Problem of Space'," Existentia Meletai-Sophias, Vol. XII, Issue 3–4 (2002), pp. 345–364; run into likewise the related assay of space qua depth in: Nader El-Bizri, "La perception de la profondeur: Alhazen, Berkeley et Merleau-Ponty," Oriens-Occidens: sciences, mathématiques et philosophie de fifty'antiquité à l'âge classique (Cahiers du Centre d'Histoire des Sciences et des Philosophies Arabes et Médiévales, CNRS), Vol. 5 (2004), pp. 171–184. Cheque also the connections of this question with Heidegger's accounts of the miracle of "dwelling" in: Nader El-Bizri, 'Being at Home Amidst Things: Heidegger'south Reflections on Dwelling', Environs, Infinite, Place iii (2011), pp. 47–71.
30. ^ For discussions in this area of research in architectural phenomenology, refer to the post-obit recent studies: Nader El-Bizri, 'On Dwelling: Heideggerian Allusions to Architectural Phenomenology', Studia UBB. Philosophia, Vol. threescore, No. 1 (2015): 5-3; Nader El-Bizri, 'Phenomenology of Place and Space in our Epoch: Thinking along Heideggerian Pathways', in The Phenomenology of Existent and Virtual Places, ed. E. Champion (London : Routledge, 2018), pp. 123-143.
31. ^ Run across: Derek Allan, Art and the Human Adventure, André Malraux'due south Theory of Fine art, Rodopi, 2009.
32. ^ Derek Allan, Art and the Human being Adventure: André Malraux'southward Theory of Art, Rodopi, 2009.
33. ^ Skada, Christine; Walter Freedman (March 1990). "Chaos and the New Science of the Encephalon". Concepts in Neuroscience. ane: 275–285.
34. ^ Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine, (Eds) (2003). Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the World Itself. Albany: SUNY Press.
35. ^ Abram, D. (1996). The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than Human Globe . Pantheon Books, New York. pp. 66. ISBN9780679438199.
36. ^ Abram, D. (1996). The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Linguistic communication in a More than-than Human Earth . Pantheon Books, New York. pp. 65. ISBN9780679438199.
37. ^ The Concept of Nature, I, Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 1952-1960. Northwestern University Printing. 1970. pp. 65–66.
38. ^ The Visible and the Invisible. Northwestern University Printing. 1968. p. 267.
39. ^ The Visible and the Invisible. Northwestern Academy Press. 1968. p. 274.
40. ^ Encounter the enquiry of Nader El-Bizri in this regard in his philosophical investigation of the notion of χώρα (Khôra) equally it figured in the Timaeus dialogue of Plato. See for instance: Nader El-Bizri, "'Qui-êtes vous Khôra?': Receiving Plato's Timaeus," Existentia Meletai-Sophias, Vol. Eleven, Effect 3-iv (2001), pp. 473–490; Nader El-Bizri, "ON KAI KHORA: Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus," Studia Phaenomenologica, Vol. 4, Issue i-2 (2004), pp. 73–98 [ane]; Nader El-Bizri, "Ontopoiēsis and the Interpretation of Plato's Khôra," Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXXIII (2004), pp. 25–45. Refer also to the more than specific analysis of related Heideggerian leitmotifs in: Nader El-Bizri, "Being at Home Among Things: Heidegger's Reflections on Dwelling", Environment, Infinite, Place Vol. 3 (2011), pp. 47–71; Nader El-Bizri, "On Dwelling: Heideggerian Allusions to Architectural Phenomenology", Studia UBB. Philosophia, Vol. threescore, No. i (2015): 5-thirty; Nader El-Bizri, "Phenomenology of Place and Space in our Epoch: Thinking along Heideggerian Pathways", in The Phenomenology of Real and Virtual Places, ed. Due east. Champion (London : Routledge, 2018), pp. 123–143.

References [edit]

• Abram, D. (1988). "Merleau-Ponty and the Voice of the World" Environmental Ethics 10, no. 2 (Summertime 1988): 101–twenty.
• Alloa, E. (2017) Resistance of the Sensible Earth. An Introduction to Merleau-Ponty, New York: Fordham University Press.
• Alloa,Due east., F. Chouraqui & R. Kaushik, (2019) (eds.) Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy, Albany: SUNY Press.
• Barbaras, R. (2004) The Being of the Phenomenon. Merleau-Ponty's Ontology Bloomington: Indiana Academy Printing.
• Carbone, M. (2004) The Thinking of the Sensible. Merleau-Ponty's A-Philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
• Clark, A. (1997) Being There: Putting Encephalon, Torso, and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Printing.
• Dillon, M. C. (1997) Merleau-Ponty'southward Ontology. Evanston: Northwestern Academy Press.
• Gallagher, S. (2003) How the Body Shapes the Heed. Oxford: Oxford Academy Press.
• Guilherme, Alexandre and Morgan, W. John, 'Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)-dialogue as being present to the other'. Affiliate 6 in Philosophy, Dialogue, and Education: Nine mod European philosophers, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 89–108, ISBN 978-1-138-83149-0.
• Johnson, Thousand., Smith, M. B. (eds.) (1993) The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, Chicago: Northwestern Upwards 1993.
• Landes, D. (2013) Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression, New York-London: Bloomsbury.
• Lawlor, L., Evans, F. (eds.) (2000) Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Mankind, Albany: SUNY Press.
• Petitot, J., Varela, F., Pachoud, B. and Roy, J-K. (eds.) (1999) Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cerebral Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Toadvine, T. (2009) Merleau-Ponty'due south Philosophy of Nature. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
• Tilliette, X. (1970) Maurice Merleau-Ponty ou la mesure de l'homme, Seghers, 1970.
• Varela, F. J., Thompson, Eastward. and Rosch, Due east. (1991) The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Scientific discipline and Human being Experience. Cambridge: MIT Printing.

External links [edit]

• Quotations related to Maurice Merleau-Ponty at Wikiquote
• Maurice Merleau-Ponty at 18 from the French Government website
• English Translations of Merleau-Ponty'southward Work
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Maurice Merleau-Ponty past Jack Reynolds
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Maurice Merleau-Ponty by Ted Toadvine
• The Merleau-Ponty Circle — Association of scholars interested in the works of Merleau-Ponty
• Maurice Merleau-Ponty page at Mythos & Logos
• Chiasmi International — Studies Concerning the Thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in English, French and Italian
• O'Loughlin, Marjorie, 1995, "Intelligent Bodies and Ecological Subjectivities: Merleau-Ponty's Corrective to Postmodernism'due south "Subjects" of Education."
• Popen, Shari, 1995, "Merleau-Ponty Confronts Postmodernism: A Respond to O'Loughlin."
• Merleau-Ponty: Reckoning with the Possibility of an 'Other.'
• The Journal of French Philosophy — the online home of the Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française
• Online Merleau-Ponty Bibliography at PhilPapers.org

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Merleau-Ponty

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